Friday, July 13, 2007
Tidak semua JI Teroris?
Sebuah logika lama yang dipertegas untuk mewarnai perdebatan pasca penangkapan Abu Dujana dkk di Indonesia. Logika tersebut akan menjelaskan mengapa begitu banyak elemen Islam yang memberikan dukungan kepada kelompok yang dianggap teroris oleh aparat keamanan Indonesia. Sebuah logika yang telah lama menjadi acuan analis intelijen sipil Indonesia.
Bagi Senopati Wirang, artikel Sidney kali ini merupakan yang terbaik yang pernah dia buat, karena obyektifitasnya cukup bisa dipertanggungjawabkan. Mungkin Sidney sudah mulai insyaf serta mulai bosan dan justru merasa ikut memikul tanggung jawab untuk memecahkan persoalan terorisme yang disebabkan oleh kelompok kecil yang berfaham radikal yang memilih jalur kekerasan. Bila semakin banyak analis obyektif dalam menuliskan analisanya, maka secara bertahap persoalan radikal agama dan teroris di Indonesia akan bisa diatasi tanpa melahirkan masalah baru.
Silahkan dibaca dalam bahasa aslinya............
"Not All JI Are Terrorists"
Sidney Jones dalam The Advertiser (Australia)
30 June 2007
For most in Australia, the name Jemaah Islamiah will be forever linked
to the horrors of the first
Bali bomb in which 88 Australians died. But to brand all JI members as
evil incarnate is to suggest that the only real counter-terrorism
option is to cast the net as wide as possible and lock up all suspects
for ever. That's what might be called the ``Guantanamo option'' – and
it won't work.
Why? Because people have joined JI for different reasons, and some can
be dissuaded from using violence; because the biggest threat of more
attacks may come from outside JI; because prisons can be a
radicalising element; and because Indonesia is a democracy where less
corruption and more justice may be as effective a means of fighting
terror as police and spy satellites.
JI is a dangerous organisation because it promotes an ideology that
condones violence against Islam's enemies in the struggle to establish
Islamic law. Towards that end it seeks to amass weapons and give
members military training to prepare for the coming battle. But many
members do not support indiscriminate violence against civilians and
reject the notion that al-Qaida-style attacks on Indonesian soil are
an appropriate response to the deaths of Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq
Many would have opposed the first Bali bombings if they had known
about the plans: not even every member of the JI central command was
in on the secret. The next three major bombings – the Marriott Hotel,
the Australian Embassy and Bali II – were effectively the work of a
splinter group led by Noordin Mohamed Top. If Noordin and his
opponents are lumped together as equally bad, the opportunity to use
the influence of the less extreme against the more extreme is lost.
Not everyone is equally committed to the cause, but any hope of
rehabilitation is undermined from the outset if anyone accused of
terrorism is considered beyond redemption. In late March, 16 convicted
terrorists – not JI – were moved from Ambon to Bali because local
authorities found that some ordinary criminals had been recruited into
Of those moved, perhaps four were doing the recruiting. The others
included young Ambonese who indeed had been involved in attacks but
who would benefit more from structured vocational training programs
than from being thrown together with hardcore ideologues who could
make them far more radical than they are now. Some young men were
caught up in operations reluctantly but felt it was a betrayal of
their friends to pull out; others joined because they were persuaded
it was a way of showing solidarity with persecuted Muslims around the
world. Many of these men need to be seen not as steelyeyed killers but
as individuals who could use some guidance.
At the same time, the ideology that teaches hatred of the U.S. and its
allies is not going to go away any time soon. It is true that U.S.
policies, from Iraq to various aspects of the war on terror to
one-sided support of Israel, help keep it alive, but very few of the
millions exposed to jihadism on the internet or through religious
study sessions become terrorists.
In Indonesia, the factors used to explain terrorism elsewhere don't
apply: the country is not under occupation and it doesn't suppress
Islamic political parties. Those who join JI and other organisations
are not a persecuted minority or alienated immigrant group.
In Ambon and Poso, two areas where bitter Christian-Muslim fighting
took place in the years following Suharto's resignation, unresolved
grievances kept young men engaged in jihadi violence long after the
sectarian strife had ended.
Address those grievances, and the ideology's attraction diminishes.
That's not the case in Java, where a network of JI schools (some 20
out of a total of 30,000 schools, so the Islamic school system is not
the problem) continues to produce a new generation of potential
recruits, and where the increasing reluctance of JI leaders to
sanction attacks is pushing some hotheads into the arms of more
But even there, one recent graduate confessed he had no skills, and
the only thing he was trained to do was teach in another JI school. It
might be worthwhile to engage the local business community to set up
onthe- job training programs to offer alternative prospects.
Some say the problem in Indonesia is democracy and that there was no
terrorism under Suharto. But virtually all the men who later became JI
leaders first joined a banned group called Darul Islam in the late
1970s and early 1980s as a protest against Suharto and went to
Afghanistan to get the wherewithal to fight him.
Authoritarianism produced JI, not democracy. Now the task is to reduce
corruption and make the Government more responsive. Those who see
victory in the recent arrests of two top JI leaders should remember
that in the early 1980s, virtually the entire leadership of Darul
Islam was arrested.
It did not kill the organisation. Instead, in 1993, it produced JI.